Conference - Workshop on the Naturalized Metaphysics of Physics

 

Venue and Date: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh - October 24, 2026

 

In light of radical ontological revision demanded by relativity and quantum mechanics, naturalized metaphysics of physics seeks to develop metaphysical accounts by taking the content, practice, and empirical successes of contemporary physical theories as the primary evidence and constraint. It rejects approaches that rely primarily on a priori reasoning or intuitions disconnected from scientific practice, while recognizing the study of the topics traditionally under the purview of metaphysics (ontology, fundamentality, laws, space and time, etc.) as critical for understanding of the picture of the world entailed by our best physical theories.

 

Speakers will share research exploring questions related to the following key themes.

1.  The analysis of the fundamental properties of putative entities and the laws of nature governing their behavior, especially within the particularly conceptually fraught areas of quantum field theory. While most of the established literature has focused on axiomatic quantum field theory, newer approaches are paying more attention to the intricacies of actual model building practices in theoretical particle physics. How do the usual lines of debate regarding particle and field interpretation change in light of these modeling practices, over and above the mathematical foundations? For both particle and field interpretations, what do these higher order modeling practices entail for our understanding of the fundamental properties and law-like behavior of these entities?

2.  The nature of scale-dependent, non-fundamental ontologies and their relationship to putative fundamental ones: Do the various the complexities of current physical theories and their modeling practices problematize or mesh with traditional notions of reduction, emergence, levels and composition? Can we accept the possibility of the study of scientific ontology, without the need for a complete final theory in hand? If so, what precautionary steps are fitting to the ontology of effective, non-final theories? Does structural realism provide sufficient precautions? How do the finer details of specific mathematical structures (from the algebraic structure of fundamental interactions, to the group representation structures for matter degrees of freedom) advance or stymie the project of structural realism? 

 

Organizing Committee

Marian Gilton

Assistant Professor, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh

 

Alexandre Silva da Eira

Graduate Student, Philosophy

 

Speakers

Katherine Brading

Professor of Philosophy, Duke University

 

Eddy Keming Chen

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Faculty of Halicioglu Data Science Institute, Affiliated Faculty of Chinese Studies, University of California, San Diego, Fellow, John Bell Institute for the Foundations of Physics

 

Hans Halvorson

Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University

 

Kerry McKenzie

Associate Professor of Philosophy, UC San Diego